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COMMENT
THE STANDING PROBLEMS-SIERRA CLUB v.
HICKEL, 433 F.2d (9th Cir. 1970) t
In the case of Sierra Club v. Hickel, one of the questions before
the court was: If hundreds of acres of national forest are ordered for
development into an all-year recreational area, does a conservation
club with nationwide membership of close to 80,000 suffer an injury
sufficient for a federal court's review?
A definitive answer to this question is of considerable importance,
particularly in an era when both governmental agencies and private
organizations are mushrooming, and the points of frictional contact
between such public and private concerns are inevitably increasing.
The legal issue raised is that of standing to sue in federal court.
Under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the "case or
controversy" clause, a federal court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain
any action unless the claimant can show that he has been injured.
Traditionally and particularly as it was shaped by early 20th century case law, the test for standing was restrictive,' in that the
alleged injury had to be actual, personal and direct. Only when "...
the right invaded [was] a legal right,-one of property, one arising
out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confer[red] a privilege... "2 was the
complainant allowed standing. Nothing short of violation of "a
private substantive legally protected interest. . . "' would suffice.
Today, the restrictive rule is undergoing important change.
Modern tendency of the court is to stress the public nature and
effect of the injury suffered, with marked de-emphasis on the plaintiffs personal "legal interest" injury.4
Last year, in Association of Data ProcessingService Organization,
Inc. v. Camp,' the U.S. Supreme Court formally recognized the
tCertiorari has been granted by the United States Supreme Court. 91 S. Ct.

(1971), 39

U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1971).
1. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 469 (1970).
2. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
3. Assoc. Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943).
4. Sometimes termed "the private attorney general" approach, the rationale is simple,
but sensible. Challenge of official agency action by a party whose concern is unofficial, but
representative of community or public concern, will be entertained. Such allowance is based
primarily on the court's awareness that if this particular plaintiff is denied standing, the
legality of the agency's act might feasibly escape judicial review. The stress is on insuring
proper exercise of agency authority. Because the plaintiff offers the court such opportunity,
for the sake of convenience and justice, he is transformed into an attorney general-his claim
being that of the community. See FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470

(1940); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
5. Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

modem approach, and established a guide for applying the liberalized
law.
Professor Davis, in his most recent article,6 analyzes that decision:
The old test of "a recognized legal interest" was specifically rejected.
In its place were two new tests. The first, based on Article III, was
"injury in fact, economic or otherwise." The Court found this test
satisfied by the injury from new competition. The second test ...
was "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of the interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
In light of these new legal developments reflecting the liberalized
trend, how then did the Sierra court resolve the question before it?
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
determined in an unreported decision, that Sierra Club had suffered
sufficiently to be allowed access to the courtroom.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed by a two-toone majority.
The court acknowledged the Camp decision. It concisely and
accurately recapitulated the liberal significance of that holding:
" 'Standing to sue', as the phrase indicates, [now] refers to the posture of the plaintiff, not the 'legal interest' to be unravelled." 7 It
recited the new two-part rule, actually quoting it from the text of
the Camp opinion. Then, by an analysis which effectively ignored the
new test, the court proceeded to a reversal of the District Court's
holding:
The complainant does not assert that any of its property will be
damaged, that its organization or members will be endangered or
that its status will be threatened. Certainly it has an "interest" in the
sense that the proposed course of action indicated by the Secretaries
does not please its officers .... [but w] e do not believe such club
concern without a showing of more direct interest can constitute
standing in the legal sense .... 8 We do not believe that the ... complaint alleges that ... its members possess a sufficient interest for
standing to be conferred. There is no allegation in the complaint that
members... would be affected by the actions of the defendantsappellants other than the fact that the actions are personally displeasing or distasteful to them (emphasis added). 9
The Sierra court's decision appears to revolve around a new concept-the "directness of interest injured" standard. Application of
such a standard points to the unavoidable inquiry as to whether the
6.
7.
8.
9.

Davis, supra note 1, at 453.
Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 31 (9th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 33.
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plaintiff's claim is enforceable at law. This search for a legal remedy
goes to the merits, and Camp, very specifically rejected such a search
for 1the substantive value of the claim as a basis for deciding standing. 0
In effect, the court has reverted to an application of the "legal
interest" test. It is this error in approach which culminates in its
ultimate error in the decision. If the court had followed the letter
and spirit of the Camp test, the results would have been as follows:
The initial requirement is for a finding of "injury in fact."
The Sierra court quotes the Camp opinion: ".

. .

injury in fact,

[may be] economic or otherwise." 1 1 It further concedes "[t] he
adverse effect, of course, need not be economic, but, as the Supreme
Court has recently observed, may be aesthetic, conservational or recreational." 1 2 The Supreme Court under the facts of Camp was
satisfied that a business was injured in fact by the existence of new
sales competition. Such a finding appears indicative of the breadth
and liberality of this requirement.
In its complaint, Sierra Club asserted that it had taken a special
interest in the conservation and sound maintenance of the national
parks and forests, and particularly lands on the slopes of the Sierra
Nevada Mountains; that such special interest would be "vitally affected" and "aggrieved" by the acts of constructing the proposed
recreational development; that the Secretaries' acts of authorizing
such construction were illegal-"administrative lawlessness"-in that
they violated enumerated statutes.1 ' It is more than mere likelihood
that upon the facts as set out in the complaint, Sierra suffered
damages sufficient to pass the initial requirement of "injury in fact."
Properly then, having found injury in fact, the court should move
to the second phase of the test-Was the alleged injury arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional provision in question?
Judge Hamley, who dissented on the standing issue, provides the
answer:
10. "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different."
Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
Further, in a footnote, that "the existence or non-existence of a 'legal interest' is a matter
quite distinct from the problem of standing." Id. at 153 n. 1.
11. Id. at 152.
12. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 32 (1970); see also Ass'n of Data Processing
Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
13. See 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1964), authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to issue permits limited by maximum number of acres and years. Sierra's argument was that the Department of Agriculture was attempting to illegally circumvent this limit by granting additional
lands for development based on a revocable permit. See, 16 U.S.C. § 45(c), contended by
Sierra to prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits for power transmission
lines in the national forest without specific congressional authority.
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The Sierra Club represents thousands of members who have a deep
interest in the aesthetic, conservational and recreational values of a
kind intended to be safeguarded by the statutes in question, and the
regulations and practices thereunder' 4 (emphasis added).

Such a dissent is alone sufficient evidence of the "arguability" of
Sierra's protected interest under the specified statutes.
The key to an affirmative resolution here is again the accent on
liberality which marks this new test over the traditional one, now
discarded.
Recall that standing to sue is a judicial concept, distinct from
actual adjudication of the case. A grant of standing is by no stretch
of the imagination the court's guarantee that the plaintiff will prevail. It means only that the court can accept jurisdiction-it has the
power to hear the parties' arguments, see the evidence submitted and
determine the issues in controversy. The final decision depends on
the substantive law.
There exists an argument that the courts will be inundated by a
wave of newly unleashed litigants if standing is liberally meted out. A
realistic counter, the truth of which has been borne out in numerous
cases, is that "....

opening the doors to anyone 'injured in fact' will

not appreciably increase the number of parties who seek to litigate.
It will cause an enormous drop in the huge volume of litigation in the
federal courts about the complexities of the law of standing. ' '
Sierra Club v. Hickel is one of the numerous cases that support this
contention. Very close to 50 percent of the court's entire opinion is
devoted to a confused and confusing explanation of what standing is,
and why ultimately it is to be denied. By allowing a hearing on the
merits, the court would have been half way into determination of its
next case, with a much fuller and more satisfying judicial result.
When it is considered that 75 percent of the public lands are
located within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit, 16 the apparent
confusion and conservatism of that court in its view of standing take
on added significance. Here denial of standing to the Sierra Club
serves to shield official agency action from judicial scrutiny in a
geographical area where such action should be most exposed to review.' 7 Such an outcome can only serve as detrimental precedent for
the "private attorney general."
V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD, III
14. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 38.
15. Davis, supra note 1, at 471.
16. Carver, The Federal Proprietary Functions-A Neglected Aspect of Administrative
Law, 19 A.B.A. Ad. Law Rev. 107, 113 (1966); see Comment, Standingof Conservationist
Organization to Challenge Federal Agency Action as "Private Attorney General"-Sierra
Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cit. 1970), 5 Suffolk L. Rev. 513, 524 (1971).
17. Comment, supra note 16, at 524.

